ICT risk management
A framework owned by the management body, from asset identification to recovery.
What assessors look forAn asset inventory linked to critical functions, reviewed yearly.
Texas, U.S. · 22 weeksInterbank Messaging and Resilience Program
U.S. Southwest · 18 weeksPCI DSS 4.0.1 Transition for a Payments Processor
Austin, Texas · 14 weeksSOC 2 Type II Readiness for an HR PlatformProve your critical functions can withstand, respond to and recover from ICT disruption, including disruption that starts at a provider.
Supervisors expect the mechanics: which assets and providers sit beneath each critical function, and how fast it recovers when one fails.
The information usually exists, spread across architecture, procurement and continuity records that have never been forced to agree. The register of information exposes that gap immediately.
The register of information is not an administrative return. It is a dependency map a supervisor can read across the sector.
Functions traced and reconciled to assets, providers and subcontractors.
Teams that apply the criteria fast, with report templates ready.
Realistic scenarios, including provider loss, against tolerances.
Contracts, exits and concentration analysis that stand up to review.
We work from the level-one text and its technical standards together.
A framework owned by the management body, from asset identification to recovery.
What assessors look forAn asset inventory linked to critical functions, reviewed yearly.
For major incidents: an initial notice within 4 hours of classification and no later than 24 hours after awareness, an intermediate report within 72 hours and a final report within one month.
What assessors look forConsistent classification and decision logs.
A risk-based testing program. Designated entities also perform TLPT, generally every three years.
What assessors look forEvery critical function covered, with remediation tracked.
Due diligence, mandatory contract provisions, exit strategies and the register of information.
What assessors look forA register that reconciles with reality.
The ESAs oversee designated critical providers; first designations announced November 2025.
What assessors look forDesignation never replaces your own due diligence.
Voluntary threat-intelligence exchange within trusted communities.
What assessors look forClear governance over what is shared, and how.
Timeframes summarize the technical standards on major-incident reporting. Each engagement works from the current text and your supervisor’s guidance.
Simulate a provider outage on a fictional bank and watch tolerances, classification and the reporting clock respond.
Our five-phase lifecycle, tuned to how supervisors examine resilience.
We start from critical functions rather than systems, so shared services such as identity and DNS are never missed.
For each requirement: what exists, what proves it and who owns it.
Scenarios built from the dependencies we actually find, tested against your impact tolerances.
Where the regulation permits a lighter approach, we record it as a reasoned decision your supervisor can follow.
The people who test your resilience are not the people who helped design your controls.
Used by your teams, readable by your supervisor.
Against the regulation and its standards, prioritized by risk.
Functions to assets, providers and subcontractors.
Completeness, quality and reconciliation.
Decision trees, roles and report templates.
Multi-year, covering every critical function.
Scoping, control team and provider involvement.
Every proposal sets out the scope, the team and the dates before work begins.
ISO, NIST and NIS2 work is useful input, but DORA adds obligations none of them cover.
| Control area | DORA | NIS2 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | ISO 22301 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICT risk framework & governance | Directly addressed | Directly addressed | Directly addressed | Partially addressed | Directly addressed |
| Incident classification against regulatory criteria | Directly addressed | Partially addressed | Partially addressed | Not addressed– | Partially addressed |
| Regulatory reporting timelines | Directly addressed | Directly addressed | Not addressed– | Not addressed– | Not addressed– |
| Continuity & impact tolerances | Directly addressed | Partially addressed | Partially addressed | Directly addressed | Partially addressed |
| Threat-led penetration testing | Directly addressed | Not addressed– | Not addressed– | Not addressed– | Not addressed– |
| Register of information | Directly addressed | Not addressed– | Not addressed– | Not addressed– | Not addressed– |
| Contract provisions & exit strategies | Directly addressed | Partially addressed | Partially addressed | Partially addressed | Partially addressed |
Directly addressed Partially addressed or different evidence expectations , Not a primary objective. For financial entities, DORA operates as sector-specific law alongside NIS2. We confirm your Member State’s position at the outset.
Proportionality and business models change where effort belongs.
The full weight of the framework, and the likeliest TLPT candidates.
Heavy reliance on processors, cloud and banking partners.
Latency-sensitive systems and strict settlement deadlines.
Large application estates and extensive outsourcing.
Clients must impose DORA provisions on you. Prepare a reusable response.
Applications fail over. The identity service they all depend on does not.
Reachable with the same admin credentials as production.
“Different” providers on the same hyperscaler.
Exit plans that assume a migration nobody has sized.
Scope, proportionality and critical functions.
OutputScoping note
Functions to assets, providers and subcontractors.
OutputDependency model
Each pillar, classification and contracts.
OutputGap assessment
Provider-loss and ransomware scenarios.
OutputExercise report
Roadmap, testing plan and board cadence.
OutputBoard briefing
Yes. Many entities met the deadline on paper and are now asked to show effectiveness: a register that reconciles, consistent classification and testing that covers every critical function.
Much of ICT risk management, but not incident reporting, the register, contract provisions, exit strategies or TLPT. We map your controls so nothing is rebuilt.
Only if your competent authority identifies you. Preparing the scope, a control team and provider arrangements strengthens ordinary testing either way.
No. You remain responsible for due diligence, contract provisions, monitoring and exit planning.
Yes. We build the playbook, train your team and sit with you during a live incident, so every report goes out on time and in your name.
Start with a scoping conversation about your critical functions, register and testing program.